This article examines the British colonial theft of Indigenous sovereignty and the particular obstacles that it presents to establishing just social relations between the colonizer and the colonized in settler states. In the first half, I argue that the particular nature of the crime of sovereign theft makes apologies and reparations unsuitable policy tools for reconciliation because Settler societies owe their very existence to the abrogation of Indigenous sovereignties. Instead, Settler states ought to return sovereignty to the land’s Indigenous peoples. (...) In the second half of this paper, I take up some of the practical questions of how this might be done and anticipate a number of objections. Giving up sovereignty would not mean dispossessing the millions of colonists who currently reside in these countries of their homes and property – but it does mean rethinking the constitutional makeup of a country and how that serves to benefit the different peoples who make their homes there. (shrink)

Cette actualité de la recherche se placera sous les auspices des deux historiennes, Michelle Perrot et Joan Scott, qui incarnent admirablement, et très précocement, l’intersection entre histoire ouvrière et histoire du genre. Toutes deux avaient commencé par une étude des mobilisations ouvrières que ce soit par l’étude des grèves (Michelle Perrot) ou par celle d’un métier masculin, les verriers de Carmaux (Joan Scott). En 1996, dans le numéro 3 de Clio, Histoire, Femmes et Sociétés sur « Méti...

Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze demandent « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? »La naïveté de la pensée et l’innocence de la questionLa philosophie doit reconnaître que son obligation pressante à l’égard de « l’histoire souterraine du problème du monde » implique qu’elle affronte les conditions de sa propre détermination. En d’autres termes, l’historicité de la philosophie est l’histoire du « monde » en tant qu’il devient problématique. Mais ce devenir problématique « n’appartient pas à l’histoire ». Dans la pensée de Merleau-Ponty comme dans (...) celle de Deleuze, est à l’oeuvre une historicité qui refl ète la genèse du problème du « monde » en tant que l’être problématique de l’ontogenèse. Je soutiendrai que Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze cristallisent la thématique qui est déjà en germe chez Fink : le problème du monde contraint la pensée à se confronter à sa pratique. Toute philosophie se trouve comme nue face à sa propre naïveté en cherchant un rapprochement avec le monde. Dans le retour vers le monde, le philosophe est contraint de mettre sa pensée en rapport avec la naïveté qui la nourrit. Mais inversement, le philosophe doit admettre le rôle intrinsèque joué par la naïveté dans la pensée elle-même, dans sa pratique philosophique propre. Ce faisant, le statut philosophique de la naïveté se trouve confirmé. Le problème du monde est dès lors le problème philosophique de la construction d’un plan pour orienter notre pensée sur larelation entre la connaissance et l’être. Par là, on a identifi é le parallélisme épistémicoontologique structurant la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? », que posent et à laquelle répondent nos deux philosophes. C’est pourquoi la présente étude soutient que c’est par la répétition philosophique du chemin par lequel le « monde » prend le statut d’un problème ontologique qu’un seuil épistémologique se trouve exposé. Le monde requiert du philosophe qu’il retrouve la naïveté intrinsèque à l’engendrement du penser, qu’il apprécie le monde en tant que problème philosophique, concept opérationnel et acte authentiquement créatif. Nous devons donc redécouvrir ce qui est importait tant à Merleau-Ponty et à Deleuze : l’expressionnisme philosophique. Ainsi, reposer la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? » constitue une répétition afi n de penser le problème du monde. Le défiposé par la naïveté contraint le philosophe à admettre lebesoin de réconcilier l’impuissance inhérente à la naïveté avec l’exigence insistante de surmonter cette impuissance d’une manière ou d’une autre et de rendre la pensée possible. Bref, ce texte cherche à dramatiser la manière dont les deux philosophes, chacun différemment, posent la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? » comme une propédeutique à l’ontologisation de la pensée. C’est pourquoi je montrerai que ce qui motive leur insistance à revenir à cette question est le besoin de comprendre leur propre pratique en tant qu’expression d’une sorte d’intuition philosophique – une pure naïveté de la pensée, une stimulation de la créativité – et, ainsi, de saisir l’être du devenir libéré de toute prétention à représenter, communiquer, fi xer l’ontogenèse. Inversement, il faut reconnaître qu’une telle transformation du motif transcendantal de la philosophie requiert de la pratique philosophique qu’elle se place aux marges de ce qui est considéré comme « savoir ».Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze chiedono “Che cos’è la fi losofia?”L’ingenuità del pensiero e l’innocenza della domandaLa filosofia non può non ammettere che il suo insistente riferimento alla “storia sotterranea del problema del mondo” deve portarla ad affrontare le condizionedella sua propria determinazione. In altre parole, la storicità [Geschichte] che guida la filosofia è la storia del “mondo” in quanto esso diviene problematico. Ma questo problematico “‘divenire’ non appartiene alla storia” [Historie]. Implicita nel pensiero di Merleau-Ponty e di Deleuze è la scoperta di una storicità che rifl ette la genesi del problema del “mondo” come il problematico essere dell’ontogenesi. In questo modo, vorrei sostenere che Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze cristallizzano il germe tematico inizialmente formulato da Fink: il problema del mondo forza il pensiero ad affrontare il suo esercizio. Ogni filosofia rimane nuda di fronte alla propria ingenuità quando cerca una riconciliazione col mondo. Ritornando al mondo, un filosofo si ritrova obbligato a mettere il pensiero alla prova di quella stessa ingenuità che lo nutre.Ma, inversamente, il filosofo deve confessare il ruolo giocato dall’ingenuità nel pensiero stesso, nella sua pratica filosofica. Così facendo, lo status filosoficodell’ingenuità resta confermato. Il problema del mondo è il problema filosofico della costruzione di un piano utile a orientare il nostro modo di pensare la relazione fra conoscenza e essere. Con ciò abbiamo identifi cato il parallelismo ontologicoepistemologico che struttura la domanda “Che cos’è la filosofia?”, così com’è posta e affrontata da Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze. Questo saggio, perciò, sostiene che è attraverso la ripetizione da parte del fi losofo del percorso mediante cui il mondo assume lo statuto di un problema ontologico che una soglia epistemologica viene dischiusa. Il mondo esige che il fi losofo trovi questa ingenuità intrinseca per generare il pensare nel pensiero, per considerare il mondo in quanto problema filosofico, in quanto concetto operativo e in quanto atto veramente creativo. Si potrebbe affermare che qui si scopre ciò che è importante per Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze: una forma di espressionismo filosofico. Pertanto, la riproposizione della domanda “Che cosa è la filosofia?” è una riproposizione, per il pensiero, del problema del mondo. La sfida dell’ingenuità costringeil filosofo a riconciliare l’impotenza relativa all’ingenuità con l’insistente esigenza di sormontare quell’impotenza, rendendo possibile, così, il pensiero stesso. In breve, questo saggio vorrebbe ‘drammatizzare’ il modo in cui entrambi i filosofi, in maniere distinte e divergenti, pongono la domanda “Che cosa è la filosofia?”, avviando in tal modo una sorta di propedeutica all’ontologizzazione del pensiero. Vorrei argomentare, dunque, che ciò che motiva la loro insistenza nel tornare sulla questione “Che cos’è la fi losofi a?” è il bisogno, per Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze, di comprendere il loro esercizio come espressione di una sorta di intuizione filosofica, una pura ingenuità di pensiero, uno stimolo alla creatività e, di conseguenza, una maniera per cogliere dell’essere del divenire libero da ogni pretesa di rappresentare, comunicare o arrestare l’ontogenesi. Per converso, riconosciamo immediatamente che una tale trasformazione della sua forza trascendentale richiede che la filosofia e il suo esercizio circoscrivano il proprio luogo ai margini di ciò che la filosofia considera propriamente come “conoscenza”. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze demandent « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? »La naïveté de la pensée et l’innocence de la questionLa philosophie doit reconnaître que son obligation pressante à l’égard de « l’histoire souterraine du problème du monde » implique qu’elle affronte les conditions de sa propre détermination. En d’autres termes, l’historicité (Geschichte) de la philosophie est l’histoire du « monde » en tant qu’il devient problématique. Mais ce devenir problématique « n’appartient pas à l’histoire (Historie) ». Dans la pensée de Merleau-Ponty (...) comme dans celle de Deleuze, est à l’oeuvre une historicité qui refl ète la genèse du problème du « monde » (image de la pensée) en tant que l’être problématique de l’ontogenèse. Je soutiendrai que Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze cristallisent la thématique qui est déjà en germe chez Fink : le problème du monde contraint la pensée à se confronter à sa pratique. Toute philosophie se trouve comme nue face à sa propre naïveté en cherchant un rapprochement avec le monde. Dans le retour vers le monde, le philosophe est contraint de mettre sa pensée en rapport avec la naïveté qui la nourrit (Husserl en est un exemple). Mais inversement, le philosophe doit admettre le rôle intrinsèque joué par la naïveté dans la pensée elle-même, dans sa pratique philosophique propre. Ce faisant, le statut philosophique de la naïveté se trouve confirmé. Le problème du monde est dès lors le problème philosophique de la construction d’un plan pour orienter notre pensée sur larelation entre la connaissance et l’être. Par là, on a identifi é le parallélisme épistémicoontologique structurant la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? », que posent et à laquelle répondent nos deux philosophes. C’est pourquoi la présente étude soutient que c’est par la répétition philosophique du chemin par lequel le « monde » prend le statut d’un problème ontologique qu’un seuil épistémologique se trouve exposé. Le monde requiert du philosophe qu’il retrouve la naïveté intrinsèque à l’engendrement du penser, qu’il apprécie le monde en tant que problème philosophique, concept opérationnel et acte authentiquement créatif. Nous devons donc redécouvrir ce qui est importait tant à Merleau-Ponty et à Deleuze : l’expressionnisme philosophique. Ainsi, reposer la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? » constitue une répétition afi n de penser le problème du monde. Le défiposé par la naïveté contraint le philosophe à admettre lebesoin de réconcilier l’impuissance inhérente à la naïveté avec l’exigence insistante de surmonter cette impuissance d’une manière ou d’une autre et de rendre la pensée possible. Bref, ce texte cherche à dramatiser la manière dont les deux philosophes, chacun différemment, posent la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? » comme une propédeutique à l’ontologisation de la pensée. C’est pourquoi je montrerai que ce qui motive leur insistance à revenir à cette question est le besoin de comprendre leur propre pratique en tant qu’expression d’une sorte d’intuition philosophique – une pure naïveté de la pensée, une stimulation de la créativité – et, ainsi, de saisir l’être du devenir libéré de toute prétention à représenter, communiquer, fi xer l’ontogenèse. Inversement, il faut reconnaître qu’une telle transformation du motif transcendantal de la philosophie requiert de la pratique philosophique qu’elle se place aux marges de ce qui est considéré comme « savoir ».Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze chiedono “Che cos’è la fi losofia?”L’ingenuità del pensiero e l’innocenza della domandaLa filosofia non può non ammettere che il suo insistente riferimento alla “storia sotterranea del problema del mondo” deve portarla ad affrontare le condizionedella sua propria determinazione. In altre parole, la storicità [Geschichte] che guida la filosofia è la storia del “mondo” in quanto esso diviene problematico. Ma questo problematico “‘divenire’ non appartiene alla storia” [Historie]. Implicita nel pensiero di Merleau-Ponty e di Deleuze è la scoperta di una storicità che rifl ette la genesi del problema del “mondo” (in quanto immagine del pensiero) come il problematico essere dell’ontogenesi. In questo modo, vorrei sostenere che Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze cristallizzano il germe tematico inizialmente formulato da Fink: il problema del mondo forza il pensiero ad affrontare il suo esercizio. Ogni filosofia rimane nuda di fronte alla propria ingenuità quando cerca una riconciliazione col mondo. Ritornando al mondo, un filosofo si ritrova obbligato a mettere il pensiero alla prova di quella stessa ingenuità che lo nutre (come mostra Husserl).Ma, inversamente, il filosofo deve confessare il ruolo giocato dall’ingenuità nel pensiero stesso, nella sua pratica filosofica. Così facendo, lo status filosoficodell’ingenuità resta confermato. Il problema del mondo è il problema filosofico della costruzione di un piano utile a orientare il nostro modo di pensare la relazione fra conoscenza e essere. Con ciò abbiamo identifi cato il parallelismo ontologicoepistemologico che struttura la domanda “Che cos’è la filosofia?”, così com’è posta e affrontata da Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze. Questo saggio, perciò, sostiene che è attraverso la ripetizione da parte del fi losofo del percorso mediante cui il mondo assume lo statuto di un problema ontologico che una soglia epistemologica viene dischiusa. Il mondo esige che il fi losofo trovi questa ingenuità intrinseca per generare il pensare nel pensiero, per considerare il mondo in quanto problema filosofico, in quanto concetto operativo e in quanto atto veramente creativo. Si potrebbe affermare che qui si scopre ciò che è importante per Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze: una forma di espressionismo filosofico. Pertanto, la riproposizione della domanda “Che cosa è la filosofia?” è una riproposizione, per il pensiero, del problema del mondo. La sfida dell’ingenuità costringeil filosofo a riconciliare l’impotenza relativa all’ingenuità con l’insistente esigenza di sormontare quell’impotenza, rendendo possibile, così, il pensiero stesso. In breve, questo saggio vorrebbe ‘drammatizzare’ il modo in cui entrambi i filosofi, in maniere distinte e divergenti, pongono la domanda “Che cosa è la filosofia?”, avviando in tal modo una sorta di propedeutica all’ontologizzazione del pensiero. Vorrei argomentare, dunque, che ciò che motiva la loro insistenza nel tornare sulla questione “Che cos’è la fi losofi a?” è il bisogno, per Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze, di comprendere il loro esercizio come espressione di una sorta di intuizione filosofica, una pura ingenuità di pensiero, uno stimolo alla creatività e, di conseguenza, una maniera per cogliere dell’essere del divenire libero da ogni pretesa di rappresentare, comunicare o arrestare l’ontogenesi. Per converso, riconosciamo immediatamente che una tale trasformazione della sua forza trascendentale richiede che la filosofia e il suo esercizio circoscrivano il proprio luogo ai margini di ciò che la filosofia considera propriamente come “conoscenza”. (shrink)

Academic dishonesty is a persistent problem in the American educational system. The present investigation examined how reports of academic cheating related to students' emphasis on their moral identities and their sensitivity to social evaluation. Seventy college students at a large southeastern university completed a battery of surveys. Symptoms of social anxiety were positively correlated with recall of academic cheating. Additionally, relative to students who placed less importance on their moral identities, students who placed more importance on their moral identities recalled (...) significantly fewer instances of cheating. In summary, these findings suggest that students are less likely to cheat on their school work when they place greater emphasis on their moral identity and are less sensitive to social evaluation. Practical interventions to rampant cheating in American schools are discussed. (shrink)

Many of the activities of clinical practice happen to, with or upon vulnerable human beings. For this reason numerous nursing authors draw attention to or claim a significant moral domain in clinical practice. A number of nursing authors also discuss the emotional involvement and/or emotional labour which is often experienced in clinical practice. In this article I explore the importance of emotion for moral perception and moral agency. I suggest that an aspect of being a good nurse is having an (...) emotional sensitivity to other human beings (patients), because this emotional sensitivity allows the nurse to perceive more accurately the context and perspective of the patient. It is thus important to the moral agency of the nurse and to morally sensitive clinical practice. As such education of the emotions should be a feature of the moral education of the nurse. A useful conception of the role of educated emotion in the moral life can be discovered in Aristotelian ethics. (shrink)

This study investigates the role that moral identity, religiosity, and the institutionalization of ethics play in determining the extent of justification of norm violating behavior among business practitioners. Moral justification is where a person, rather than assuming responsibility for an outcome, attempts to legitimize ethically questionable behavior. Results of the study indicate that both the internalization and symbolization dimensions of moral identity as well as intrinsic religiosity and the explicit institutionalization of ethics within the organization are significant determinants of the (...) moral justification of unethical behaviors. (shrink)

Kin selection, reciprocity and group selection are widely regarded as evolutionary mechanisms capable of sustaining altruism among humans andother cooperative species. Our research indicates, however, that these mechanisms are only particular examples of a broader set of evolutionary possibilities.In this paper we present the results of a series of simple replicator simulations, run on variations of the 2–player prisoner's dilemma, designed to illustrate the wide range of scenarios under which altruism proves to be robust under evolutionary pressures. The set of (...) mechanisms we explore is divided into four categories :correlation, group selection, imitation, and punishment. We argue that correlation is the core phenomenon at work in all four categories. (shrink)

Global poverty measurement is important. It is used to allocate scarce resources, evaluate progress, and assess existing projects, policies, and institutional designs. But given the diversity of ways in which poverty is conceived, how can we settle on a conception and measure that can be used for interpersonal and inter-temporal global comparison? -/- This book lays out the key contemporary debates in poverty measurement, and provides a new analytical framework for thinking about poverty conception and measurement. Rather than trying to (...) find some essential meaning of poverty, the author recommends explicitly reflecting on the purposes served by the concept and the values that do and should inform our conceptions and measures. -/- After reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of five competing conceptions of poverty and their corresponding measures, the book concludes with specific recommendations for the future. Poverty measurement should be developed through a process of public reason that gives weight to the voices of those individuals who are most marginalized and deprived. The author suggests new values, desiderata, and candidate indicators that should be used in a pro-poor poverty measure. (shrink)

The brief, practical texts in the Essentials of Qualitative Methods series introduce social science and psychology researchers to key approaches to capturing phenomena not easily measured quantitatively, offering exciting, nimble opportunities to gather in-depth qualitative data. In this book, Scott D. Churchill introduces readers to existential phenomenological research, an approach that seeks an in-depth, embodied understanding of subjective human existence that reflects a person's values, purposes, ideals, intentions, emotions, and relationships. This method helps researchers understand the lives and needs (...) of others by helping identify and set aside theoretical and ideological prejudgments. About the Essentials of Qualitative Methods book series: Even for experienced researchers, selecting and correctly applying the right method can be challenging. In this groundbreaking series, leading experts in qualitative methods provide clear, crisp, and comprehensive descriptions of their approach, including its methodological integrity, and its benefits and limitations. Each book includes numerous examples to enable readers to quickly and thoroughly grasp how to leverage these valuable methods. (shrink)

In “Property Rights and the Resource Curse” Leif Wenar argues that the purchase and sale of resources from certain countries constitutes a violation of property rights, and the priority in reforming global trade should be on protecting these property rights. Specifically, Wenar argues that the U.S. and other western liberal democracies should not be complicit in the trade of so-called cursed resources, and the extant legal system can be used to end the trade in cursed resources by prohibiting the importation (...) of cursed resources, litigating against companies that operate in resource-cursed countries, and imposing trade tariffs on third party countries’ exports if they trade in cursed resources. In this paper, I show that while Wenar is correct that the trade in cursed resources is morally objectionable and therefore creates additional moral obligations for participants in that trade, his normative assessment fails to take account of the complexity of the resource curse and his prescriptive proposal for clean trade will not reduce harm in resource-cursed countries. I suggest that the reduction of harm, rather than the enforcement of property rights, should be the normative and practical focus in evaluating and reforming trade in natural resources. (shrink)

Introduction to the Special Volume, “Method, Science and Mathematics: Neo-Kantianism and Analytic Philosophy,” edited by Scott Edgar and Lydia Patton. At its core, analytic philosophy concerns urgent questions about philosophy’s relation to the formal and empirical sciences, questions about philosophy’s relation to psychology and the social sciences, and ultimately questions about philosophy’s place in a broader cultural landscape. This picture of analytic philosophy shapes this collection’s focus on the history of the philosophy of mathematics, physics, and psychology. The following (...) essays uncover, reflect on, and exemplify modes of philosophy that are engaged with these allied disciplines. They make the case that, to the extent that analytic philosophers are still concerned with philosophy’s ties to these disciplines, we would do well to pay attention to neo-Kantian views on those ties. (shrink)

Bhimrao Ambedkar is well-known as the architect of the Indian constitution, the document that created the world's largest democracy when it came into effect in 1950. Ambedkar is also famous, or infamous according to some religious partisans, in the Indian political context for his unflagging and often bombastic advocacy on behalf of India's so-called "untouchables." Being a Mahar, an untouchable caste in the Indian state of Maharashtra, Ambedkar knew of the struggles and the religiously underwritten violence that was foisted upon (...) these swaths of Indian society. His struggles in and against the caste system, and the Hindu religious-philosophical system that frequently enabled it, are well documented by... (shrink)

This manuscript reviews and synthesizes most of the major research studies in the area of consumer ethics that have appeared since 1990. It examines both conceptual and empirical works with an objective of encouraging researchers to pursue research in the consumer ethics area. Toward this end, the paper also suggests directions for future research.

The two volumes of Philosophical Essays bring together the most important essays written by one of the world's foremost philosophers of language. Scott Soames has selected thirty-one essays spanning nearly three decades of thinking about linguistic meaning and the philosophical significance of language. A judicious collection of old and new, these volumes include sixteen essays published in the 1980s and 1990s, nine published since 2000, and six new essays. The essays in Volume 1 investigate what linguistic meaning is; how (...) the meaning of a sentence is related to the use we make of it; what we should expect from empirical theories of the meaning of the languages we speak; and how a sound theoretical grasp of the intricate relationship between meaning and use can improve the interpretation of legal texts. The essays in Volume 2 illustrate the significance of linguistic concerns for a broad range of philosophical topics--including the relationship between language and thought; the objects of belief, assertion, and other propositional attitudes; the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility; the nature of necessity, actuality, and possible worlds; the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori; truth, vagueness, and partial definition; and skepticism about meaning and mind. The two volumes of Philosophical Essays are essential for anyone working on the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Bhimrao Ambedkar is well known as the architect of independent India’s constitution, the document that created the world’s largest democracy on January 26, 1950. Ambedkar is also famous for his vigorous advocacy on behalf of India’s so-called “untouchables,” those groups of people that reside beneath and outside of the ancient system of hereditary castes in Hinduism. His activism and political efforts secured rights and respect for millions of lower-caste Indians before his death in 1956. Even though Ambedkar was an untouchable, (...) forbidden from learning the ancient language of Sanskrit, he managed to learn English in his early education... (shrink)

I talked to my chair for hours, without it responding—and then I heard its voice, its desire, its rhetoric: sit in me.A new specter of materialist thought, conveniently cloaked in "realism," now haunts philosophy and rhetoric—object-oriented ontology and object-oriented rhetoric.1 Ostensibly, OOO arrives as the logical next step for theories of anti-, extra-, and post-humanism that have, over the past several decades, sought to destabilize the privileged position of human exceptionalism....

An obstacle to abortion exists in the form of abortion ‘counselling’ that discourages women from terminating their pregnancies. This counselling involves providing information about the procedure that tends to create feelings of guilt, anxiety and strong emotional reactions to the recognizable form of a human fetus. Instances of such counselling that involve false or misleading information are clearly unethical and do not prompt much philosophical reflection, but the prospect of truthful abortion counselling draws attention to a delicate issue for healthcare (...) professionals seeking to respect patient autonomy. This is the fact that even accurate information about abortion procedures can have intimidating effects on women seeking to terminate a pregnancy. Consequently, a dilemma arises regarding the information that one ought to provide to patients considering an abortion: on the one hand, the mere offering of certain types of information can lead to intimidation; on the other hand, withholding information that some patients would consider relevant to their decision-making is objectionably paternalistic on any standard account of the physician-patient relationship. This is an unsettling conclusion for the possibility of setting fixed professional guidelines regarding the counselling offered to women who are considering abortion. Thus, abortion ought to be viewed as an illuminating example of a procedure for which the process of securing informed consent ought to be highly context-sensitive and responsive to the needs of each individual patient. This result underscores the need for health care professionals to cultivate trusting relationships with patients and to develop finely tuned powers of practical judgment. (shrink)

Aristotle's treatment of trade in the Politics book one is usually regarded as especially hostile, and this is put down to snobbery and political prejudice on his part. The Greeks often regarded trade as a degrading thing for a free man to engage in, and it would be surprising if Aristotle's view of trade were entirely unconnected with this Greek sensibility. But there should be something more definite than a loose general affinity if a charge of prejudice is to be (...) taken seriously. A balance of hostile judgements over argued cases to back them up would be some sort of evidence for prejudice, and prima facie evidence against would be anything like a theory from which the hostile judgements followed as conclusions. Theories can be concocted to give the required conclusions, of course, and then we must try to decide how serious the theory is. It comes to this: is there so little in the reasons Aristotle gives for his condemnation of trade that they may be convincingly explained away and belittled as no more than expressions of attitudes? (shrink)

This study seeks to understand and critique the growing online trend of “revenge porn,” or the intentional embarrassment of identifiable individuals through the posting of nude images online. This posting of intimate pictures, often done out of motives of revenge for perceived relational scorn, is enhanced by the varying levels of online anonymity. Using the theoretical framework of John Dewey's pragmatism, this study both analyzes this understudied but complex new problem precipitated by the conditions of the online self and establishes (...) the groundwork for the use of pragmatist ethics in other areas of communication ethics. (shrink)

The data in this special issue are both encouraging and discouraging. On the positive side, researchers are making theoretical breakthroughs into the psychology of the academic cheater, which may result in practical interventions. Yet the studies illustrate the sheer magnitude of the problem and the resources needed to address unethical behavior among the younger members of the American academe. In short, this special issue shows that the "Internet revolution" facilitates new types of academic dishonesty (Sisti, this issue; Stephens, Young, & (...) Calabrese, this issue); that academic cheating is often an intentional, planned act that results from a Machiavellian tendency to neutralize moral sanctions against cheating (Harding, Mayhew, Finelli, & Carpenter, this issue); that motivations to cheat differ across students (Davy, Kincaid, Smith, & Trawick, this issue; Wowra, this issue); and that academic cheating is a symptom of a larger problem (Lovett-Hooper, Komarraju, Weston, & Dollinger, this issue; Wowra, this issue). (shrink)

Looking back, the moral panic that precipitated the decimation of horror comics in the 1950s seems quaint, yet concerns about the psychological impact of violent media on consumers have never disappeared. In this article, I outline a particular type of psychological impact we ought to take seriously when evaluating the moral status of entertainment. I then consider (a) ways in which comics seem immune from claims that they create this kind of impact for their readers, as well as (b) ways (...) in which we might think that comics generate special instances of moral danger for readers. (shrink)

American democracy, while no stranger to internal conflict, has seemingly reached a boiling point regarding political partisanship. Things have gotten so bad that parties rarely talk to each other on important issues, and shutting down the government over ideological disagreements has become a more or less accepted move. Tom Allen, a former U.S. representative from Maine, paints this provocative picture of how the warring political parties in the U.S. government see each other: “Democrats see Republicans as inattentive to evidence and (...) expertise, unconcerned about Americans struggling to get by, and reflexively opposed to government action to deal with our collective challenges. On the other hand, Republicans see.. (shrink)

Now over a decade since the publication of John Michael’s Anxious Intellects (2000), many rhetoric scholars are no less anxious about the relevance of scholarship to public affairs. Recent exchanges concerning rhetorical criticism, public intellectualism, and academic engagement continue to provide evidence of a prominent felt need to prove public relevance, explain away the lack of readily apparent public engagement, or adopt a more activist posture. That academic work should have political consequences is broadly assumed within a dominant strain of (...) rhetorical scholarship owing to what is doubtless an incontrovertible feature of reality—words have political consequences. From this fact, many rhetoric scholars .. (shrink)

International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) face difficult choices when choosing to allocate resources. Given that the resources made available to INGOs fall far short of what is needed to reduce massive human rights deficits, any chosen scheme of resource allocation requires failing to reach other individuals in great need. Facing these moral opportunity costs, what moral reasons should guide INGO resource allocation? Two reasons that clearly matter, and are recognized by philosophers and development practitioners, are the consequences (or benefit or harm (...) reduction) of any given resource allocation and the need (or priority) of individual beneficiaries. If accepted, these reasons should lead INGOs to allocate resources to a limited number of countries where the most prioritarian weighted harm reduction will be achieved. I make three critiques against this view. First, on grounds the consequentialist accepts, I argue that INGOs ought to maintain a reasonably wide distribution of resources. Second, I argue that even if one is a consequentialist, consequentialism ought not act as an action guiding principle for INGOs. Third, I argue that additional moral reasons should influence decision making about INGO resource allocation. Namely, INGO decision making should attend to relational reasons, desert, respect for agency, concern for equity, and the importance of expressing a view of moral wrongs. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIncreasing attention is being directed at the impact of fake news on democratic societies across the globe. Scholars in a range of fields are attempting to determine who is behind fake news...

ABSTRACT This article explores what the contours of a pragmatist theory of rhetoric would be like in its democratic instantiation. The threat of partisan thought and dogmatism in argument is examined as a threat to the sort of democratic community pragmatists such as John Dewey desired to create. Partisans fail to realize not only their own limitations in pursuing the true and the good but also the fact that solving problems through overly partisan forms of reasoning or argument only creates (...) future obstacles to community life. This provides an extended reading of what Dewey meant by free communication: communication not only free from legal constraints and censorship but also free from the binding habits of thought and interaction that can be identified as “partisan perfect reasoning.”. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that speech act theory can be altered to accommodate art objects as evocative illocutionary speech acts that are aimed toward reaching understanding. To do this, I discuss the example of Zen Buddhism's use of the kōan, an aesthetic object that can be seen as evoking a given experience from its auditors for the purpose of reaching understanding on a point that the teacher wishes to make. I argue that such a reading of art as evocative (...) can be merged with hypothetical intentionalism insofar as it recognizes a certain orientation on the part of the auditor to approach art in a certain way. In the case of kōans and other artworks, the approach is one of considering what claim an author may want to convey through the auditor's experience of the artwork. (shrink)

In this paper I address the claim that it is morally wrong to seek the elimination of certain human kinds characterized by disability by preventing the representative members of the relevant kinds from existing. I argue that there are compelling reasons to take a qualified interpretation of this claim seriously. Specifically, the aim of this paper is to endorse one consideration that illustrates a morally problematic feature of seeking to eliminate human kinds. I defend the claim that it is morally (...) wrong to reduce the diversity of humans who recognize each other as agents deserving of equal respect and moral standing. I do not argue that this is the most important factor to consider when addressing the possibility of eliminating human kinds; I claim only that it deserves more serious consideration than it has so far received in the existing literature. This ‘diversity argument’ ought to affect the debate concerning the permissibility of eliminating human kinds that are characterized by disability in two ways: (a) it generates a prima facie obligation to preserve human kinds that ought to affect the way the concerns of disability activists are balanced against our obligation to prevent harm to future persons, and (b) the argument ought to change the polarized tone of the current debate by providing a broadly convincing reason to oppose the elimination of human kinds that shows distinct respect for the unique perspective of disabled persons and the value of their contribution to the moral community. (shrink)

One theme that unites many, if not all, pragmatists is the theme of community, whether in the form of communal matters of truth production and verification in shared experience or in the search for the ideal sociopolitical public. Thus Richard Bernstein closes his study of community, a concern “so fundamental in the pragmatic tradition,” by connecting it to the communicative interests of all the pragmatist thinkers he examines: “Fallibility, openness, criticism, mutual respect, and recognition are essential dimensions of their understanding (...) of communities” (1998, 154). Bernstein reminds us that individuality and community are inseparably linked: individuals are the “matter” that gives existence to a community .. (shrink)

The thought of William James, due to its pragmatically-inclined and contextually-engaged character, would seem to hold great resources for normative subfields of philosophy such as business ethics. Yet not much research has been done on what James could tell us about substantive topics in business ethics, or in terms of the methodology of ethics research. I start such an exploration by examining the concept of the ideal in James's work and how it can be a conscious and vivid way of (...) infusing activity with a larger significance, solving the problems James notes about current orientations toward activity that are driven by mere habit. I tie this analysis into two important issues in business ethics: the debate over what "integrity" is and the concern over the differing methods used in business ethics research. (shrink)

Research suggests that typically developing children begin to understand verbal irony around 5 or 6 years of age. Children's production of verbal irony, however, has not previously been examined. This study was a preliminary investigation of children's irony production, including both verbal and gestural (nonverbal) forms. We coded instances of irony in interactions within 118 family triads, each consisting of 1 parent and 2 children, aged 3 to 15 years. Triads performed an 8-min cooperative task with dominos. In this context, (...) gestural irony was used more frequently than verbal irony: 80% of the families used gestural irony at least once and 32% used verbal irony at least once. Children produced gestural irony as early as 4 years of age, and verbal irony as early as 5 years of age. Children's use of irony was not related to their general cognitive ability or vocabulary, but was related to use of irony by other members of the triad. Results suggest that social context is important to the emergence of irony production. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article argues that we should take the philosophical thought of Bhimrao Ambedkar, the Indian politician and advocate for “untouchable” rights, seriously as part of the pragmatist tradition. Doing so will reveal the international impact of pragmatist thought and will contribute to current concerns over how citizens should communicate and pursue advocacy in pluralistic societies. As a student of Dewey's, Ambedkar took pragmatist ideas of democracy and integrated them into his reading of Buddhism. His reconstruction of nonviolence as love (...) of one's friends and enemies leaves him open to criticisms from those favoring revolutionary means to achieve social justice. The final section considers criticisms stemming from insurrectionist ethics and argues that Ambedkar operates as an important emancipatory counter to this position. Ambedkar's pragmatism holds back from violent means, as they tend to destroy too many people and valued ends that one needs for an ideal democratic community. (shrink)

In Legality, Scott Shapiro builds his case for legal positivism on a simple premise: laws are plans. Recognition of that fact leads to legal positivism, Shapiro says, because the content of a plan is fixed by social facts. In this essay, I argue that Shapiro’s case for legal positivism fails. Moreover, I argue that we can learn important lessons about the prospects for positivism by attending to the ways in the argument fails. As I show, the flaws in Shapiro’s (...) argument reveal structural problems with a family of prominent positivist views, including the one defended by Joseph Raz. (shrink)

The frequency and opportunity for unethical behavior by MIS professionals is examined empirically. In addition, the importance of top management's ethical stance, one's sense of social responsibility and the existence of codes of ethics in determining perceptions of the frequency and opportunity for unethical behavior are tested.Results indicate that MIS professionals are perceived as having the opportunity to engage in unethical practices, but that they seldom do so. Additionally, successful MIS professionals are perceived as ethical. Finally, while company codes of (...) ethics were uncommon, top management was seen as supporting high ethical standards. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In written work and a lecture at the 2008 Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences that was co-sponsored by the Canadian Philosophical Association, Margaret Somerville has claimed that allowing same-sex marriage is unethical because doing so violates the inherently procreative function of marriage and thereby undermines the rights and duties that exist between children and their biological parents. In my paper, I offer five reasons for thinking that Somerville’s argument for this conclusion is unpersuasive. In each case her (...) argument either begs important questions about same-sex marriage or else relies on insufficient evidence to justify excluding a vulnerable minority group from participating in a state-sponsored social institution. RÉSUMÉ: Dans ses écrits ainsi que dans une conférence prononcée en 2008 au Congrès de la Fédération canadienne des sciences humaines, coparainnée par l’Association Canadienne de Philosophie, Margaret Somerville a prétendu que les mariages entre personnes de même sexe sont éthiquement inacceptables parce qu’ils violent la fonction primordiale du mariage, à savoir la procréation, et qu’ainsi ils portent atteinte aux droits et responsabilités qui lient les enfants et leurs parents biologiques. La présente communication se propose d’offrir cinq raisons pour lesquelles le point de vue de Margaret Somerville ne saurait convaincre. Dans chaque cas, sa pensée soit ne tient pas compte d’importantes questions soulevées par le mariage entre personnes de même sexe soit se fonde sur des prémisses inadéquates dans le but de faire interdire à une minorité vulnérable l’accès à une institution sociale garantie par l’État. (shrink)